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Introduction
Climate risk has been defined and assessed by scientists (Parry, 2007) and governments (Defra, 2012 ) However, it is well established that public perceptions of risk often diverge from experts' estimates of risk (Slovic, 1987; Slovicet al., 1979) . Public perceptions are important in defining both societal and individual responses to climate risk. While there is some research on public perception of climate change in the context of mitigation -the reduction of greenhouse gases -(e.g. Pidgeon (2012)), there is much less research in the context of adaptation, i.e., "in human systems, the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In natural systems, the process of adjustment to actual climate and its effects; human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate" (Field, 2012) . Adaptation to a changing climate has become an increasingly important response strategy given the failure in curbing greenhouse gas emissions and the "climate change commitment" due to past emissions. In essence adaptation to climate change is inevitable and already happening but on a limited basis (Adger et al., 2007) The UK was the first country in the world to adopt climate change legislation that includes both adaptation and mitigation in 2008 (the Climate Change Act 2008). The Act requires Government to assess the risks of the current and predicted impact of climate change for the UK. The first Climate Change Risk Assessment, as it is known, was published in January 2012. Every five years a new assessment will be conducted. The Government is also required to put together a programme for adaptation to climate change that addresses the risks identified in the CCRA. The National Adaptation Programme, as it is known, was published in July 2013. The Act also gives government the power to ask certain organisations to produce reports on: 1) the current and future predicted impacts of climate change on their organisation and 2) their proposals for adapting to climate change. Given the advanced and pioneering nature of climate adaptation policy in the UK (Mullan et al., 2013) , we have focused this review on this country. The appropriateness of taking a country specific approach is further supported by both the region specific nature of climate risks, and the fact that risk perception itself has been shown to be place and culture specific (Weber & Hsee, 1999) . This paper reviews all the relevant literature pertaining to public perceptions of climate risk and adaptation measures in the UK. Section 2 opens with a general discussion of the difference between expert and non-expert perceptions of risk, and highlights the need to explore lay perceptions of both climate change and individual climate hazards. Section 3 details the literature search method used to identify those papers directly relevant to public perceptions of climate risk and adaptation in a UK context. Section 4 focuses in more detail on non-expert mental models of climate change: identifying 1) the conflation of climate change with pollution; 2) the perceived nature of climate hazards 3) the perceived distance of climate change impacts; and 4) perceptions of established versus 'new' hazards, as key issues. Section 5 discusses the relationship between climate change awareness and willingness to adapt, drawing upon findings from outside the UK to supplement the discussion of the extent to which belief in anthropogenic climate change may be necessary for adaptation to take place. Section 6 goes on to focus on the relationship between hazard experience, risk perception and willingness to engage in adaptation actions. Section 7, discusses the potential influence of emotion and affect on perceptions of climate risk and adaptation. Section 8 focuses on perceived responsibility and agency and how they may impact upon willingness (and perceived ability) to adapt to climate hazards. Section 9 covers the potential influences of place attachment and identity on what is considered 'acceptable' adaptation; drawing upon non-UK research where a dearth exists with respect to the UK. Section 10 discusses the role of personal and political values and the need to explore the extent to which they may act as barriers or enablers to adaptation. The implications of the above for climate risk communication are then discussed in Section 11, with Section 12 concluding by outlining directions for further research.
Risk perception: The difference between non-experts and experts
In their classic work on risk perception, Slovic, Fischoff and colleagues contrasted expert risk analysis with the perceptions of non-experts (Slovic, 1987; Slovic et al., 1979) . Based on the disparity between expert and non-expert rankings of risks (Fischhoff et al., 1978) , it was concluded that while expert assessments of risk are grounded in technical projections of expected death, injury and property damage, the perceptions of non-experts are not (Slovic, 1987) . Instead, factors such as risk familiarity, level of exposure, and the extent to which dread is evoked, were identified as key components of non-expert risk perception, becoming known as the psychometric paradigm. Risks eliciting 'higher dread' due to their catastrophic potential were associated with greater perceived threat and calls for regulation, regardless of actual fatality statistics or experts' estimates (Slovic, 1987) . The psychometric paradigm has been critiqued on the grounds that the three factors explain only a minority of variance in perceived threat (Sjoberg, 2000) . However, while the model may not incorporate all dimensions of risk perception, it illustrates the divergence between the manner in which experts and lay people conceptualise risk.
More recently, the 'risk as feeling' framework (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Slovic, Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005), and dual-process models of choice and judgement (Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Stanovich & West, 2000 , have been drawn upon to account for the disparity between the outputs of technical risk assessment and public risk perception. In keeping with the dread dimension of the psychometric paradigm, the "risk as feeling" framework holds that affective responses to hazards drive perceptions of risk. Dual-process theories meanwhile posit that humans possess two modes of thought, the experiential and the analytic (Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000 . First, the affective/experiential mode is characterised as being fast, associative, affect-driven and relatively cognitively untaxing. Second, the cognitive/analytic mode is characterised as being slow, deliberative, rule-based, and cognitively taxing. The latter is presumed to be indicative of the formal thought processes required for scientific thinking, while the former is relied upon more frequently in everyday thinking. Hence, individuals may vary in the extent to which they rely on these modes in different situations, with the affective/experiential mode especially being called upon when time, knowledge, or cognitive effort are limited (De Neys, 2006; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Stanovich & West, 2008) . Indeed, while scientific thinking is associated with the utilisation of cognitive/deliberative thought, even experts may rely on affective/experiential processes in some situations. To improve public debate and communication about climate change, it is therefore important to understand how public perceptions of climate risk differ from the risk conceptualisations of experts engaged in scientific thinking (Weber & Stern, 2011 ). Dessai, Adger and colleagues have argued that it is therefore important to consider both external conceptualisations of danger (i.e. scientific analysis focussing on physical and social systems) and internal conceptualisations of danger (i.e. individual and social perceptions and experiences) to: a) define what constitutes "dangerous climate change"; and b) determine the limits of adaptive capacity .
Of course, the term 'climate risk' encompasses numerous individual hazards (e.g., flooding, drought, heatwaves, etc.) where uncertainty exists as to their future occurrence or magnitude of impact (Travis & Bates, 2014) . Public perceptions of climate hazards may therefore be domain specific; depending on familiarity, salience, and the extent to which an event evokes a strong negative affective response. For instance, Harvatt et al. (2011) found that the threat posed by sea level rise was less salient than other forms of flooding to at-risk individuals in Southern England. Moreover, some hazards may not be perceived as a threat. On surveying respondents in England (South-East and the East Midlands) and Southern Scotland, Palutikof et al. (2004) found that many favoured the prospect of hotter summers and warmer winters, especially in Scotland, where average summer temperatures are lower than in England. Scottish respondents were also less likely than their English counterparts to state that they would respond to an increase in the frequency of hot summers by reducing water use or avoiding the sun. These results illustrate the potential for regional differences in perceptions for different hazards, and the need to explore both multiple regions of the UK and multiple climate hazards. They also further highlight the need for a UK focussed review of public climate risk perception and attitude towards adaptation.
Literature search method
Papers were identified in a search procedure with two phases. In the first phase, we conducted a systematic literature search to identify peer reviewed papers directly related to public perception of climate risk and adaptation measures in the UK. Combinations of relevant keywords pertaining to climate change (e.g. climat* risk, flood*, weather extreme) and risk (e.g. risk perception, risk communication) were used to search the Web of Science and Scopus databases (see Appendix A). This search, conducted during October 2012, yielded 59 papers, of which 24 were retained. Papers were retained only if they met our inclusion criterion, involving a focus on UK public perceptions of climate risks and adaptation measures. In a second phase, ten additional articles were identified in the citations of the articles retained from the above described search. In total, 34 articles on the subject of UK public perceptions of climate risks and adaptation were reviewed. See Appendix B for a summary table of the papers identified through this search. These UK specific papers are the focus of this article. However, where appropriate our discussion is supplemented by findings from the broader risk perception literature and selected non-UK research, with the latter primarily being drawn upon where no UK-specific research currently exists.
Of the papers identified 3 included a UK sample as part of a European (2) or worldwide (1) study (or series of studies). 10 papers either specified that their sample was UK-wide sample, or did not specify precise location. Amongst those papers that specified a narrower geographic focus, England was most heavily represented, with 13 articles focussing on this region. Of the remainder, 3 focussed on Scotland, 2 on England and Scotland and, 2 on England and Wales. With respect to methodology a mixture of qualitative and quantitative designs were represented amongst the articles. Surveys were the most commonly used design, followed by interviews, focus groups and experiments. A case study, participatory workshop, and study involving q-sorting were also reported. Reflecting the variety of methodologies utilised, sample sizes ranged from n=15 to n>1800.
The following sections are based on a systematic analysis of these 34 papers.
Climate change awareness and the mental models of non-experts
As noted, the literature on perceptions of climate change highlights the disparity between the mental models of experts and those of lay people (see Weber and Stern (2011) ) for a review). Mental models reflect how people conceptualise complex information including about risks, their causes and what preventative or protective steps might be taken to avoid negative outcomes. They are typically assessed by qualitative interviews in which particular conceptualisations of risk and misapprehensions regarding causes and consequences are identified, followed by surveys in which their prevalence is ascertained (Bruine de Bruin & Bostrom, 2013). With respect to perceptions of the risk posed by climate change, three key characteristics of lay mental models have emerged: the conflation of climate change with other forms of pollution; the nature of climate hazards; 'perceived distance' and new hazards.
Conflation of climate change and 'pollution'
A tendency to conflate climate change with diffuse notions of pollution has been consistently observed in studies across the UK, US and Europe (Bostrom, Morgan, Fischhoff, & Read, 1994; Kempton, 1991; Lorenzoni et al., 2006; Reynolds et al., 2010) . In an exploration of the imagery lay people associate with climate change Lorenzoni and colleagues (Lorenzoni et al., 2006) found that a large proportion of both UK and US participants made reference to environmental risks such as ozone depletion, when asked to discuss climate change; a finding echoed by Whitmarsh (2009). More recently, Fischer et al. (2012) observed that many interviewees did not delineate between environmental issues. Lay perceptions of specific climate hazards may also diverge from scientific understanding. In a series of UK interviews with older adults and their social contacts it was found that some conflated the dangers posed by heat waves with those of UV exposure (Wolf et al, 2010) . Such misapprehensions are potentially dangerous as they may lead to individuals failing to take appropriate actions in response to hazards (e.g. applying sunscreen but not taking steps to prevent dehydration)
Nature of climate hazards
When comparing US and UK residents, Lorenzoni et al. (2006) found striking differences. UK participants were more likely to reference 'weather' and 'rain'; while US participants were more likely to reference 'heat' and 'ice caps melting'. Once again, this highlights the importance of understanding climate risk perception in a country-specific context. In another UK study, when participants were presented with an open-ended question asking them to detail what they felt the impacts of climate change would be "changes in/extreme weather" and "flooding" were the most common responses; while "temperature increases/heat" were only the ninth most common response (Whitmarsh, 2009 ). This study, based upon data gathered in a 2003 survey, also found that responses to probes about climate change causes, effects and general associations varied depending on whether the term "global warming" or "climate change" was used. The former tended to evoke more associations with heat and human causes, while the latter tended to evoke more associations with a range of climate and weather events and impacts that had already occurred.
Perceived distance
Perceived distance has been identified as a key influence on climate risk perception. In this context distance may be loosely defined as the extent to which the impacts of climate change are perceived as a) spatially distant or geographically far away; b) temporally distant or far in the future; or c) socially distant or unlikely to impact oneself (Spence et al., 2012) . Lorenzoni et al. (2006) found that while much of people's affective imagery about climate risks was dramatic and disastrous, it also tended to be geographically distant and therefore not directly relevant to the participants. In a more recent study, Spence et al. (2012) found that while less than half of their sample reported geographical, temporal or social distancing, all forms of distancing were associated with a) lower climate change concern; and b) greater uncertainty regarding the existence and effects of climate change. Optimistic bias, the perception that one's personal risk from a potential hazard is lower than that of others in society (Weinstein, 1987) , has also been linked to greater climate change risk acceptance amongst UK residents (Costa-Font et al., 2009).
With regard to adaptation specifically, evidence also exists to suggest that perceived uncertainty and temporal distance may act to inhibit action when individuals are aware of potential risks. In an investigation of Christchurch Bay and the Orkney Islands, two UK coastal communities at risk from sea level rise, residents taking part in in-depth interviews frequently expressed the notion that 'something should be done' (Few et al., 2007) . However, most were unwilling to actively accept any of the proposed courses of action. Uncertainty regarding if and when change would occur, along with the fact that adaptation benefits may only be experienced in the distant future and the existence of competing (and more immediate) concerns, emerged as barriers to action.
New hazards
As noted, familiarity has been identified as a key influence on risk perception (Slovic, 1987) . In the 'social amplification of risk' framework, hazards that are less familiar (but high in dread) are predicted to generate greater publicity (through both media and social interaction) and higher perceived threat than those that are more familiar (Kasperson et al., 1988; Slovic, 1987) . However, as will now be discussed, recent research suggests that hazard familiarity does not impact on risk perception in a unitary fashion.
In their interviews with residents in two UK areas at potential risk from both inland and coastal flooding (Truro, Cornwall and Alderburgh, Suffolk) Harvatt et al. (2011) found less public understanding of the latter. They also noted that, when discussing the issue of rising sea levels, participants tended to draw upon related, but more familiar hazards such as flooding and coastal erosion. Indeed, people tend to use analogy when trying to understand unfamiliar risks (Visschers et al., 2007) , such as those associated with carbon capture and storage (CCS) (Wallquist et al., 2010) . CCS and specific climate hazards are, of course, very different risk domains. However, the notion that the perception of less familiar climate hazards can be driven by spontaneously generated intuitive associations would be in keeping with dual-process theories of choice, reasoning and judgement. Such models hold that in scenarios where the employment of analytic, rule based thinking is not possible due to limitations in time, knowledge, or cognitive effort, people must rely on associative, affect-driven 'experiential' processes (Stanovich & West, 2000 .
Of course, it should be noted that greater national familiarity with specific hazards may not be sufficient to induce greater perceived personal risk. Indeed, many people at risk of flooding do not perceive themselves as such (Burningham et al., 2008; Fielding, 2012) . Moreover, experience with a hazard may lower perceptions of risk when pronounced negative outcomes have not been sustained (Halpern-Felsher et al., 2001).
Climate change awareness and adaptation
Longitudinal analysis of public opinion polls indicate that while consensus amongst experts as to the existence of anthropogenic climate change is overwhelmingly high (Doran & Zimmerman, 2009 ), belief in the existence of manmade climate change amongst non-experts in the UK and elsewhere is prone to greater vacillation (Ratter et al., 2012) . However, the extent to which climate change awareness is necessary for adaptation to specific climate hazards to take place is one that is yet to be systematically addressed in a UK context. A recent study did find a significant correlation between climate change awareness and stated willingness to pay for/willingness to adopt domestic level flood protection amongst respondents in England and Wales (Bichard & Kazmierczak, 2012) . However, more research is needed to determine the extent to which general climate change awareness influences a) awareness of specific climate related hazards; and b) willingness to engage in adaptive behaviours.
As a dearth of UK focussed literature currently exists with respect to the relationship between climate change awareness and adaptation, one might reasonably look to findings obtained in other developed countries. Here however a somewhat mixed picture emerges. A recent survey with householders in Dresden (Kreibich, 2011) observed only a weak association between climate change awareness and willingness to undertake emergency and precautionary action in response to the threat of flooding amongst respondents. Household size, the experience of prior flood-related losses and whether individuals were home owners or tenants had a much stronger relationship with uptake of protective measures. Further afield, interviews and surveys with landholders in South West Australia (Mazur et al., 2013) have found no difference between climate change believers and sceptics with respect to adaptive actions currently undertaken, with believer and sceptic alike tending to focus on short-term rather than long-term actions. However, two other Australian studies undertaken with rural residents (Buys et al., 2012 ) and a selfselected sample of the general public (Alexander et al., 2012) indicate that support for proactive, anticipatory adaptation initiatives may be lower amongst climate sceptics. In the latter case, individuals who did not believe that sea level rise is occurring tended to be strongly opposed to proactive retreat from coastal areas.
In a recent US survey, general support for preventative adaptive action to limit the damage caused by future storms and sea level rise was found amongst the general public (Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment, 2013). Of particular interest however is the finding that a majority (60%) of respondents who doubted the existence of climate change still supported some form of adaptation in this area. Of course, the damage caused by Hurricane Sandy in 2012 is likely to be salient in the minds of many US residents, be they believers in climate change or otherwise. Flooding meanwhile is a hazard frequently experienced in the UK and many other European countries. One might therefore anticipate that climate change awareness and belief may have a more pronounced influence on willingness to support and adopt adaptive measure to 'new' climate hazards than those that have already occurred in a particular locale. Thus, in a UK context, willingness to support and undertake adaptation measures designed to reduce the potential damage caused by future flooding may be less influenced by climate change awareness than willingness to support proactive adaptive measures designed to reduce the impact of less familiar -and less well understood -climate related hazards. However, more UK focussed research is needed to ascertain whether this is the case.
Experience, hazard perception and action
In the field of decision research the role of experience in the formation of risk perceptions judgements has, over the last decade or so, received an increased amount of attention. When making choices and judgements from experience, people tend to overweight both very recent events (Hertwig et al., 2004 ) and rare events (Keller et al., 2006) relative to their probability of occurring. The threat of severe, yet rare, events may also be underweighted (again, comparative to their objective probabilities of occurring) as a consequence of their infrequency (Hertwig & Erev, 2009 ). In terms of the heuristics and biases framework set out by Kahneman et al. (1982) , experiencing an event increases its cognitive availability, which in turn increases the perceived likelihood of an event recurring. Although, it should be noted that evidence also exists to suggest that being exposed to a hazard, but not sustaining any negative effects as a result, may reduce judgements of the risk posed by it (Halpern-Felsher et al., 2001).
Flood experience and action
Flooding is likely to increase as a result of climate change in the UK (Defra, 2012) . Previous work indicates strong association between flood experience and flood risk awareness (Burningham et al., 2008) . A survey study conducted across 13 European locations including Scotland found a positive association between experience of flooding and both flood awareness and flood preparedness, as well as increased worry regarding flooding. However, neither awareness nor worry was found to associate with preparedness (Bradford et al., 2012) . Responses to open ended questions also suggested that risk perception amongst those who had previously experienced flooding can diminish as a consequence of new flood defences being erected. Other UK studies have found that those who had previous experience with flooding were more likely to have taken steps to install property-level flood protection --though uptake of many measures was still relatively low (Harries, 2012; Lamond et al., 2009 ). In one study this relationship was found to be partially mediated by anxiety avoidance (discussed in more detail in the next sub-section), perceived likelihood of future flooding and perceived (in)adequacy of insurance to cover losses (Harries, 2012) , Another investigation observed a) that UK participants who reported direct flood experience were more likely to have adopted some form of protection than those who had not; and b) a positive association between perceived risk severity and uptake of protective measures (Soane et al., 2010) . Also reported here however was a negative association between flood experience and lower perceptions of agency and responsibility (factors found to be positively associated with the uptake of flood protection). As will be discussed further in the sub-sections on emotion and responsibility, experience may not always be a unanimously positive predictor of adaptation actions.
Experience and action in the context of other climate hazards
Less research exists on the relationship between risk perception, adaptation and prior experience of other climate related hazards amongst members of the British public. One UK survey (Palutikof et al., 2004) found that respondents who reported experiencing personal discomfort during a recalled heat wave tended to perceive the heat wave as having more pronounced negative impacts in other areas (e.g. health service provision, agriculture, work productivity), than those who reported experiencing personal comfort. It would thus seem possible that past experience of discomfort may also influence perception of future events and willingness to adopt adaptive measures. A study examining perceptions of drought and climate change in Southern and Anglian regions of England found that while people living in areas affected by the 2006 regional drought tended to report altering their behaviour and enacting water saving measures in response to water-shortages, they did not persist in doing so outside of the drought period (Dessai & Sims, 2010) . Hence, experience with certain hazards may be more likely to elicit transient rather than long-term behavioural change.
Experience of climate hazards and beliefs about climate change
Another interesting observation made in the Southern and Anglian drought research was that awareness of climate change was unrelated to willingness to modify water consumption behaviour (Dessai & Sims, 2010) . This is echoed by the findings of another study, this time conducted with individuals with and without personal experience of flooding, which found that those with reporting experience of flooding were no more likely to report a) believing that anthropogenic climate change is real; b) perceiving climate change to be personally threatening; or c) taking action out of concern for climate change, than those without direct experience of flooding (though significantly more general concern about climate change was reported by those with flooding experience than those without) (Whitmarsh, 2008) . A more recent examination of the relationship between flood experience and willingness to engage in climate change mitigation behaviours did however did find a positive association between reported flood experience and willingness to reduce energy consumption : with this relationship being mediated by concern about climate change, perceived ability to make an impact by taking action, and perceived climate change risk to local area. This disparity in findings could be explained in a number of ways. As the authors of the latter study note, it is possible that recent flooding events in the UK, along with greater salience of public discourse regarding climate change, may have now rendered the link between climate change and the potential for increased flooding more salient amongst those with flood experience. Differences in sampling and the definition of 'flood experience' may also have contributed to the difference in findings between the two studies: The former surveyed respondents from a specific region of England (Hampshire) and defined 'flood experience' as having property (i.e. home, garden, car) damaged by flooding (Whitmarsh, 2008) . The second survey utilised a representative nationwide sample and defined 'flood experience' more loosely (i.e. by asking participants if they had experienced flooding in their area) .
It is worth mentioning that, in the study finding no relationship between direct flooding experience and perceived personal risk from climate change, those reporting experience of air pollution did perceive more personal climate risk (Whitmarsh, 2008) . This may either be evidence that air pollution elicits greater and more affectively-laded associations with notions of "global warming" and "greenhouse gasses", or the result of air pollution exposure increasing environmental values. Those reporting experience of air pollution scored higher on a short form of the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) scale, which measures pro-environmental values (Dunlap et al., 2000) . Another recent study, this time focussing on climate scepticism amongst Scottish farmers, linked reported experience of increases in pests and diseases to both stronger belief in the existence of anthropogenic climate change and personal perceived risk from climate change (Islam et al., 2013) .
The extent to which experience of particular climate related hazards influence general climate risk perception is one that requires further scrutiny. With regard to adaptation in particular, it would seem that the relationship between prior experience and preparedness/willingness to engage in anticipatory adaptation may depend on the nature of the hazard. The extent to which willingness to undertake adaptive measures might generalise across climate related hazards requires further investigation.
Affect and emotion
In the broader judgement and decision making literature, affect has long been recognised as a key influence on risk perception. Affect can loosely be defined as the feelings of 'goodness' or 'badness' an event evokes, while emotion is a more intense and multidimensional experience. The importance of both affectiveassociations (see sections 5 and 6) and risk related emotion has been recognised in several studies examining perceptions of climate change and related hazards.
As touched upon above, findings regarding flood experience and willingness to undertake adaptive measures indicate that those with flood experience are on average more likely to adopt domestic-level flood protection than those without. However, the findings of one recent study suggest that while experience is associated with risk perception and belief in the inadequacy of insurance, which increase protective behaviour, it was also linked to anxiety avoidance, which in turn was linked to a decrease in protective behaviour (Harries, 2012) . This study measured participants' anxiety avoidance by asking them to rate their agreement with the statement "I don't want to be reminded of the risk of flooding." These findings are consistent with previous work (Harries, 2008) , which found that a desire to preserve feelings of security in the home may, in certain cases, act as a barrier to the adoption of protective measures. That is to say that the anxiety associated with acknowledging that one's property is at risk, may be a barrier to action. This, it is argued, suggests that a) reducing insurance coverage for those at risk of flooding; and b) using anxiety-provoking communications when trying to promote the uptake of flood protection may be counterproductive; with many seeking strategies to allay anxiety rather than adopt protection. The sentiment that the use of anxiety provoking communications may be ineffective is supported by the findings of a survey conducted with a pan-European sample, in which self-reported worry was not found to correspond with greater flood preparedness (Bradford et al., 2012 ).
Concerns about the potential counter-productive effects of 'alarmism' in general climate risk communication and entertainment have also been noted. In a survey examining viewer responses to the climate change disaster film The Day After Tomorrow, it was found that while viewers reported greater anxiety regarding climate change and a desire to "do more" to mitigate climate change, temporal distancing increased; perhaps as a strategy for anxiety avoidance (Lowe et al., 2006) . A later study (Howell, 2011) , in which viewer responses to climate-change disaster movie The Age of Stupid were investigated, did find a link between viewing the film and an increase in mitigation behaviours, suggesting that the anxiety-provoking stimulus did succeed in eliciting behavioural change. However, pre-tests indicated that participants in this study tended to possess high levels of climate concern prior to viewing the movie. Hence, it would seem possible that the impact of anxietyprovoking communication on action (mitigation or adaptation) may to an extent depend on existing values. Taken as a whole however the above mentioned findings do appear to suggest that eliciting high levels of anxiety may, at least some of the time, lead to avoidance rather than protective action. This position is supported by investigations examining participant responses to severe hypothetical climate change scenarios. One study found that focus-group participants made a high number of statements denoting helplessness and fatalism, regardless of whether they had been previously classified as 'fatalists' (Bellamy & Hulme, 2011) . Another revealed that while many participants demonstrated an 'adaptive' pattern of response when presented with a local 'warming' scenario (e.g. concern, willingness to take personal adaptive action), when the magnitude of change increased, responses became more 'maladaptive' (e.g. belief that individual/collective action would be ineffective, support for government intervention while placing little trust in government to respond effectively when the severity of the scenario was increased) (Niemeyer, Petts, & Hobson, 2005) .
The use of appeals to fear in general climate change communication has also been critiqued by O'Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009), who observed that while dramatic, alarmist imagery tended to succeed in inducing climate change concern, it also appeared to reduce perceived self-efficacy with respect to "doing something about climate change" and increase psychological distancing, denial and apathy. In the broader risk communication literature, Witte and Allen's review of the efficacy of fear appeals, suggests that they tend to be effective only when they trigger moderate (rather than high) fear, and provide recipients with easy to implements strategies to reduce risk (Witte & Allen, 2000) .
With respect to climate change adaptation in the UK, the above findings suggest that communications designed to elicit fear and anxiety may fail to lead to adaptive individual-level behavioural changes amongst the public, unless they also provide recipients with clear, easy to implement guidelines as to how to reduce risk of harm.
Responsibility and agency

Responsibility
When considering the role of responsibility in public attitudes towards climate change adaptation, two key questions emerge: 1) To whom is responsibility for managing climate risks ascribed?
2) To what extend does the attribution of responsibility influence willingness to engage in adaptation?
With regard to the matter of who the UK public perceive to be responsible for managing climate related risk, the available evidence suggests widespread attribution of responsibility to both central and local government. Survey studies asking about responsibility for managing flood risks also show a generally high attribution of responsibility to government (Bichard & Kazmierczak, 2012 ) and regulators (Soane et al., 2010) . Although it should be noted that in the former study a majority of respondents also attributed responsibility for protecting individual properties to home owners. On examining the themes emerging from interviews with members of the public in three UK cities affected by flooding, one study found that respondents a) tended to locate responsibility with local authorities; and b) perceived their own power with regard to flood risk management to be low . Hence, despite recent emphasis on the public assuming more responsibility for flood risk management, lack of perceived power along with perceived lack of action by local government and others to whom power is attributed may prove to be a barrier to citizens engaging in flood risk management.
The relationship between attribution of responsibility and uptake of protective action with respect to the adoption of domestic level flood protection is not however clear cut. One investigation found that uptake of protection was higher amongst respondents who rated the responsibility of regulators as low; with lower attribution of responsibility to regulators and scientists corresponding with lower perceived challenge in obtaining domestic flood protection (Soane et al., 2010) . However, another found that attribution of responsibility was not significantly associated with willingness to adopt flood protection (though a weak correlation between "acceptance of responsibility" and amount willing to pay was in evidence) (Bichard & Kazmierczak, 2012) . Interestingly, an association between flood experience and the attribution of greater responsibility to governing bodies with regard to flood protection was observed in both investigations.
Amongst residents of the southern and Anglian regions of England surveyed regarding drought and water restrictions, a majority stated that responsibility for water management lay with private companies (with a similar proportion stating that the government should be responsible) (Dessai & Sims, 2010 ). Few stated that private individuals were or should be responsible. However, as previously noted many did report adopting water saving measures during the shortage period.
The extent to which one perceives oneself to be responsible for a particular hazard may also influence willingness to adopt adaptation measures, especially in instances where one is not the direct beneficiary of an adaptation measure. A case study examining the willingness of those living in a Scottish village to cooperate with a flood management project, found that despite distrust in communicators and anger over a perceived lack of communication, the community was generally speaking willing to cooperate (Howgate & Kenyon, 2009 ). It was concluded that this 'willingness to cooperate' was, in part, linked to a perceived responsibility towards helping communities that would be the intended beneficiaries of the project.
Together these findings present a somewhat mixed picture. Attribution of responsibility to local and national government appears to be high, yet the extent to which this constitutes a direct barrier to willingness to engage in (or financially support) adaptation is unclear. The Scottish case study suggests that perceived responsibility can, in at least some instances, facilitate 'altruistic' acceptance of adaptation. However, the extent to which this might generalise to a broader context is yet to be determined. More research is needed in order determine precise influence of attribution of responsibility on willingness to passively support and actively engage in both adaptive measures that are self-benefitting and those that could be considered 'altruistic'.
Agency
As noted above, in interviews with members of the public in a high flood risk area, "powerlessness" with respect to flood risk management emerged as a common theme amongst participants . This raises the matter of agency, a concept related to yet distinct from that of responsibility. In the context of risk response, agency can be defined as one's perceived ability to successfully engage in protective behaviours. Within the risk literature, agency has been linked with willingness to take protective action. Indeed, perceived behavioural control isalong with behavioural attitudes and subjective norms -one of the three key predictors of behaviour included in Ajzen and colleagues' highly influential (and widely applied) theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen & Madden, 1986 ).
In the domain of climate risk perception, agency has been linked to willingness to engage in both mitigation and adaptation amongst UK residents. For instance, perceived instrumentality (operationalized by level of agreement with the statement "I can personally help to reduce climate change by changing my behaviour") was found to be a significant predictor of willingness to undertake energy saving measures . In an examination of the antecedents of flood protection purchase, agency, along with responsibility, was linked to the adoption of protection (Soane et al., 2010) . Another recent study however did not find self-efficacy to significantly contribute to the prediction of protective behaviour (Harries, 2012) .
Although it is acknowledged that this may be due to a) self-efficacy being too narrowly operationalized in the study (i.e. by level of agreement with the statement "I don't think I would be able to choose the right way to protect my home"); or b) selfefficacy predicting the adoption of short-term reactive measures rather than longterm protective actions (a conclusion previously drawn by a Netherlands based investigation conducted by Zaalberg et al. (2009)).
In their comparison of householder responses to threats posed by inland flooding and sea level rise, Harvatt et al. (2011) predict that active protective response to the latter threat is likely to be lower than that to the former. This disparity proposed to have arisen as a consequence of both lower understanding of, and to lower perceived agency with respect to, the (less familiar) threat of sea level rise.
It would seem that with regard to agency and adaptation, further investigation is needed to establish a) how members of the UK public perceive their own personal agency with respect to responding to both familiar and unfamiliar climate hazards; b) the extent to which agency, links to self-efficacy and perceived control in determining adaptive behaviour.
Place attachment and identity
Place attachment
In their discussion of the social limits of climate change adaptation, Adger and colleagues (Adger et al., 2009 ) stress that adaptive capacity cannot be thought of purely in terms of physical, structural and technological limitations and thresholds. It is inevitable that factors such as culture, identity, attachment to place, values and regional risk attitudes will determine both the perceived need to adapt and the acceptability of particular adaptive measures. However, while some argue the importance of examining how lay people's perceptions of climate change are related to their relationship with the landscape (Brace & Geoghegan, 2011; Geoghegan & Leyson, 2012) , and note the need to consider attachment to place in relation to climate change adaptation (Devine-Wright, 2013); there are, to the present authors' knowledge, no UK studies examining place attachment from a climate change adaptation lens. Recent work focussing on acceptance of renewable energy developments in Northern Ireland has however suggested that the relationship between attachment to place and acceptance of development in the area is not unilaterally negative (Devine-Wright, 2011); but rather a matter of whether the perceived nature of development fits with the symbolic meanings attached to place. While not directly pertaining to climate change adaptation, one might reasonably anticipate that similar issues may arise in instances where climate adaptation takes the form of large scale structural developments. Further research is however needed to ascertain whether this is the case.
Identity
As with place attachment, personal identity is a factor that is yet to be fully investigated in the context of UK climate adaptation. However, recent work suggests that, in a climate risk communication context, it may play a role in determining: a) recognition that one is at risk from a particular hazard; b) recognition that adaptive measures should be taken; and c) responses to risk communication. In qualitative analyses examining older adults attitudes towards and ability to cope with heat wave related risks, it was found that many identified (by experts) as being 'at risk' did not perceive themselves as such (Abrahamson et al., 2009; Wolf et al., 2010) . While there was general recognition amongst participants aged 65 and above that being old or in poor health placed one at greater risk during heat waves, many participants did not think of themselves as being older adults. As Abrahamson et al. point out, this disparity between self-perception and external classification could mean that targeted awareness campaigns may miss their mark. This underscores a need to ascertain how those identified as being particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate hazards perceive themselves and their level of risk.
Values
In the broader literature a number of frameworks for identifying and classifying values have been drawn upon to explain individual differences in risk perception (and response to) risk. Some, such as the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) scale (Dunlap et al., 2000) , aim to measure beliefs and attitudes in a specific area (e.g. those pertaining to the environment). Others, such as Schwartz's measures of 'fundamental values' (Schwartz, 1992 (Schwartz, , 1994 ) and cultural theory (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983 ) take a broad approach; holding that individuals hold domain general values. For instance, one measure of 'fundamental values' classifies individuals as 'self-transcendent' versus 'self-enhancing'. A 'self-transcendent' orientation has been linked to both environmental values (Stern, et al., 1999) , andin one UK study -to stronger belief in the existence of anthropogenic climate change (Poortinga, Spence, Whitmarsh, et al., 2011) Cultural theory meanwhile holds that there are four fundamental "cultural views": Hierarchists value social and institutional hierarchies and view nature as manageable if appropriate regulations are enforced; Egalitarians, while concerned about group welfare, reject institutionally imposed regulation and view nature as fragile and easily disrupted; Individualists emphasise personal freedom and personal responsibility, and view nature as benign; Fatalists tend to view outcomes as the product of chance and nature as fundamentally outside human control. It has been proposed that the four "ways of life" postulated by cultural theory map onto views regarding climate change and its solutions (Thompson & Rayner, 1998) ; with Hierarchists favouring expert-driven regulatory approaches to mitigation, Egalitarians favouring voluntary approaches, Individualists favouring market-based approaches, and Fatalists being disengaged from the matter. In one survey study it was found that, consistent with the views on nature detailed above, "way of life" had a significant effect on ratings of concern regarding abrupt climate change; with egalitarians expressing more concern than individualists and fatalists (Bellamy & Hulme, 2011) . However, in a follow-up focus group, statements consistent with fatalism were prevalent, despite the group containing only one individual who had previously been classified as such. "Way of life" also failed to align with the predictions regarding policy preference initially set out (Thompson & Rayner, 1998) ; with regulatory and market-based approaches being favoured across "ways of life". Hence, evidence regarding the efficacy of operationalizing cultural theory as a quantitative 'individual difference' measure appears to be mixed.
While widely drawn upon, the use of cultural theory as an individual difference measure of risk perception has been critiqued by Sjoberg (2000) who argues that individual risk sensitivity and domain specific attitudes are more robust predictors of perceived risk. Environmental values represent one such set of domain specific attitudes. As previously touched upon, score on the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) scale has been found to be a strong predictor of belief in the existence of anthropogenic climate change Whitmarsh, 2008 Whitmarsh, , 2011 amongst UK residents. They have also been found to be associated with greater climate change concern, perceived personal threat from climate change, and willingness to engage in mitigation actions (Whitmarsh, 2008) . The relationship between environmental values and willingness to accept and actively engage forms of climate change adaptation does not however appear to have been researched.
The three studies cited above have also shown political affiliation to be a robust, independent predictor of climate change belief; with right-of-centre political beliefs tending to correspond with greater climate scepticism Whitmarsh, 2008 Whitmarsh, , 2011 ). This finding is congruent with research conducted elsewhere (McCright & Dunlap, 2011 , 2013 Zia & Todd, 2010) . Again however, while a clear association between political affiliation and climate belief exists, the manner in which it may influence attitude towards adaptation is less clear.
In the context of UK adaptation, Glenk and Fischer (2010) found a 'cognitive hierarchy' of values, with the 'fundamental values' identified by Schwartz (1992) (e.g. self-transcendence versus self-enhancement) influencing more domain specific 'governance-related values', which in turn influence perceptions of concrete proposals, including public flood insurance and soft engineering. Specifically, a selfenhancement orientation was found to correspond with greater perceived threat severity and a focus on the governance value of "efficiency". A selftranscendence/conservation orientation meanwhile corresponded with a focus on "sustainability" and "solidarity". Those placing high importance on "sustainability" tended to rate the soft-engineering alternative more highly than others, while those placing high importance on "solidarity" tended to rate the insurance alternative more favourably than others.
Whether the existence of a cognitive hierarchy of values can be supported with respect to other adaptation scenarios remains to be seen. However, the findings discussed above strongly suggest that individual values (including political affiliation) may impact not only on climate risk perception, but willingness to accept and undertake adaptation measures. Thus, the extent to which general and specific attitudes, along with individual differences in risk sensitivity, influence attitudes towards adaptation warrants further enquiry. Some climate hazards will be more familiar to UK residents than others. .As noted in Section 4 communicating 'new' and less familiar climate change impacts, work in the field of emerging technologies suggests that it may be useful to draw on analogy and association with risks that are more familiar (Visschers et al., 2007; Wallquist et al., 2010) . Indeed, the process of attitude elicitation itself may influence the formation of mental representations (Siegrist, 2010) . Therefore, when investigating and informing perceptions of unfamiliar climate hazard, it is important to keep in mind that people may form representations of (and attitudes towards) said hazard in response to the manner in which it is phrased and framed. (Siegrist et al., 2003) . Questions regarding the extent to which this may impact on willingness to engage in adaptation behaviours are thus raised. As previously noted, political affiliation has been found to be strongly linked to climate change belief and concern in both the UK and elsewhere (McCright & Dunlap, 2013; Poortinga et al., 2011; Whitmarsh, 2011) ; hence, willingness to undertake or accept adaptation measures in response to specific climate change impacts may also be influenced by the identity and perceived values of communicators. Consideration of the role of identity in communication would also seem to be warranted. As Abrahamson et al. (2009) note, if the targets of information campaigns do not identify themselves as 'at risk' from particular climate hazards, communication may be ineffective. Work examining the relationship between place attachment and attitude to change and development suggests that people are more likely to accept such when it is perceived as congruent with existing values and associations attached to the area (Devine-Wright, 2011). While this is a matter yet to be fully explored with respect to climate impacts in the UK specifically, this issue of whether communications seeking to elicit support for adaptation measures in a particular area are more effective when they are congruent with how local people perceive and utilise the area is one that warrants further examination.
Uncertainty
In communicating with the public about climate change, its potential impacts, and the steps that might be taken to adapt to them, one further issue that must be addressed is that of uncertainty; or, more precisely, how information regarding uncertainty in climate and climate impact projections should be presented. The difficulties inherent in communicating this to both policy makers and the public is a topic of on-going concern in the field of climate risk management (Dessai & ). In one recent study, which used focus groups to examine perceptions of surface flood warnings, misunderstandings of likelihood information (presented as percentages) were observed amongst both members of the public and professional emergency responders (Parker et al., 2011) .Thus the importance of ensuring that numeric information is interpreted as it is intended should be stressed.
Verbal categories such as "likely" or "unlikely" are another way in which probabilistic information can be represented (Wallsten & Budescu, 1995) . Indeed the IPCC fourth and fifth assessment reports have guidelines as to the range of values to be covered by terms such as 'likely' (Mastrandrea et al., 2010) . However, it has been found that, unless explicitly presented along the corresponding quantitative information, there is great variation between individuals in the manner in which these terms are interpreted (Budescu, Broomell, & Por, 2009 (Dessai & Sims, 2010) . In terms of emerging and less familiar threats however less evidence is available. Case studies examining UK communities threatened by sea-level rise suggest that the perceived temporal distance between the present and the hazard taking place can be a barrier to proactive adaptation (especially when the measures in question may have a pronounced impact on the lives of those affected) (Few et al., 2007) . It is possible that such reluctance may be even greater where future threats lack historical precedence (e.g. new diseases, wildfires in areas previously unaffected). However, no clear assertions can be made on this point at present; more research is needed to understand attitudes towards adaptation in the context of unfamiliar hazards resulting from climate change. Likewise, the extent to which beliefs about climate change are associated with willingness to adapt to climate change impacts requires further exploration.
With respect to the relationship between emotion and response to climate change risk and impacts a somewhat complex picture emerges. While anxiety is a likely result of experiencing or feeling at risk from climate change and associated impacts such as flooding, the available evidence suggests that this may in some instances lead to avoidance (Harries, 2008 (Harries, , 2012 ; O'Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009). Hence, anxiety provoking communications may have the unintended consequence of inducing mood protection through denial and avoidance rather than action to reduce risk (Lowe et al., 2006) . Although it should be noted that work in the broader field of risk communication suggests that such appeals can be effective if they provide recipients with clear, easy to execute steps to reduce their own risk (Witte & Allen, 2000) . Where no such steps are presented however, even individuals already concerned about climate change may perceive a lack of personal agency with respect to risk reduction (Lowe et al., 2006) .
On the subject of agency and its influence of willingness to undertake adaptation behaviours more broadly, there is some support for a link between perceived selfefficacy and willingness to a) engage in protective behaviours against flood risk (Soane et al., 2010) ; and b) engage in certain mitigation behaviours . In the case of the former however it should be kept in mind that not all studies have found such a relationship (Harries, 2012) . Although it is noted that this may be the result of self-efficacy having a greater influence on the uptake of short term measures. When it comes to the related but distinct concept of responsibility however findings are less clear cut while attribution of responsibility to public authorities and private organisations for managing threats such as flooding and drought appears to be high ( Greater exploration of the exact manner in which perceptions of both agency and responsibility impact on willingness to undertake and support adaptation measures would thus seem to be warranted.
The extent to which political affiliation and other personal values impact on willingness to engage in adaptation is another area that deserves further exploration. While a number of studies have examined the relationship between personal values and beliefs about climate change, these have tended to focus on concern regarding anthropogenic climate change than attitude towards adaptation to specific climate change impacts. Glenk and Fischer (2010) suggest that willingness to accept adaptation measures may be governed by a 'hierarchy of values' with more global personal values impacting on more concrete attitudes towards specific schemes. However, the generalizability of this framework warrants further testing. The influence of place attachment and identity on willingness to engage with and endorse particular forms of adaptation should also be addressed.
A wide body of literature on the subject of risk communication exists. However, when it comes to the question of how one can best communicate information regarding risks posed by climate change and the steps that might be taken to adapt to resultant impacts to the public in a specific region, there is not a readymade solution. 
